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An analysis published in AnewZ’s opinion section says Iraq’s Kurdistan Region has yet to form a cabinet, nearly two years after the parliamentary election held on October 20, 2024. The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) won 39 of the 100 parliamentary seats, while the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) secured 23. Neither party won enough seats to form a government on its own.
The ongoing rivalry has slowed parliament’s work and extended the tenure of the outgoing cabinet beyond its term. Recent talks have suggested an agreement may be possible, but no final coalition deal or timeline for forming a government has been announced.
Under the framework being discussed, the KDP would retain the regional presidency and prime minister’s post, while the PUK would receive the vice-presidential posts and the position of parliament speaker, alongside a redistribution of key ministries. The PUK wants the finance and peshmerga ministries, while the KDP is seeking the oil and interior ministries. KDP officials have stressed that the proposals are still under discussion. The PUK has also called for the vice-presidential posts to carry broader powers rather than amounting to titles alone.
Qubad Talabani, deputy prime minister and son of the late Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, said he hoped an agreement would be reached this autumn. An official from the Kurdistan Islamic Union said a substantive meeting between the KDP and PUK could take place in November. On October 14, regional President Nechirvan Barzani and U.S. Consul General Gwendolyn “Wendy” Green called for the talks to be accelerated. These signals indicate that the parties have resumed contact, but do not mean their differences have been resolved.
Factors hindering an agreement
The analysis says the planned completion of the process to unify the peshmerga forces on September 21, 2026, has provided positive momentum toward establishing the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). However, several structural problems continue to stand in the way of an agreement.
The first problem goes beyond the number of cabinet posts: the dispute concerns effective control over the KRG, revenues and security institutions. The KDP is stronger in Erbil and Duhok, while the PUK has a stronger position in Sulaymaniyah and Halabja. Parallel administrative and intelligence structures linked to the parties make the real division of power difficult. For this reason, unifying command structures is as important as distributing ministries.
Coalition talks have also widened to include a broader political framework. The PUK’s agreement with the New Generation Movement (NGM), which won 15 seats, strengthens the PUK’s position in negotiations. The NGM has not been guaranteed a place in a future cabinet, but its alliance with the PUK remains in place. Earlier proposals to establish a mechanism for resolving disputes if the coalition collapses and to hold early elections could help prevent future political deadlock. This would require political commitments that can be enforced. Threats of new elections and the possibility that Sulaymaniyah could move in practice toward separate administration illustrate the potential consequences of a failed agreement.
The influence of Baghdad and regional actors
Baghdad also affects political arrangements in the region. Issues including civil servants’ salaries, federal budget transfers, oil exports and disputed territories make it important for the Kurds to speak with one voice. The PUK’s ties with federal politicians, including Nouri al-Maliki and Hadi al-Amiri, reflect its contacts with Baghdad. However, these ties do not establish that Baghdad is mediating an agreement on the cabinet.
Turkey, Iran and the United States also have an interest in a stable Kurdistan administration, although their relations with the two parties differ. For Turkey, prolonged political division complicates security cooperation against the PKK, cross-border trade and energy transit, despite Ankara’s close ties with the KDP. Iran has historically maintained closer relations with the PUK, while Washington has encouraged institutional unity.
The analysis stresses that a functional, broadly representative cabinet could better manage relations with Baghdad and neighboring states, but would not resolve external disputes on its own.
The most constructive outcome could be a KDP–PUK coalition accompanied by parliament resuming its work and clearly defined powers for the vice-presidential posts. A limited agreement based only on distributing positions might restore a formal government but fail to overcome institutional fragmentation.
Another possibility is that talks will continue into 2027 as the parties dispute ministries, appointments and the alliance with the New Generation Movement. New elections could be raised as a means of pressure, but they would not necessarily change the existing balance of power. Key indicators of progress would include the functioning of parliament’s leadership, a publicly released coalition agreement, and credible steps toward unifying security and financial administration.
The analysis was written by Dr. Ayman al-Dessouki, a senior researcher and strategic expert at the TRENDS Research and Advisory Center in the UAE and a professor of international relations at Cairo University. AnewZ notes that opinions published in its opinion section belong to their authors and do not reflect the publication’s official position.
