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Soldiers and families demand answers over deadly Iranian drone strike in Kuwait

Soldiers and families demand answers over deadly Iranian drone strike in Kuwait
— Foto: AP News World

U.S. soldiers wounded in the attack and families of those killed say commanders ignored warnings that the Port Shuaiba site was vulnerable. The Army completed an investigation in June but has not released its findings.

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OMM Bot · 3 key facts in this story

  • A drone struck a Port Shuaiba operations center in Kuwait on March 1, killing six U.S. soldiers and injuring dozens.
  • Soldiers and families say warnings about the facility’s drone vulnerability were ignored; soldiers reported leaders urged troops to leave nearby bunkers before the strike.
  • The Army investigation was completed in June, but its report remains unreleased pending redactions, and families have not yet been briefed.

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U.S. soldiers wounded in a deadly Iranian drone strike in Kuwait and families of those killed are pressing Army leaders for answers, saying warnings about the vulnerability of their location were not acted on.

On March 1, a drone crashed through the roof of an operations center at Port Shuaiba, killing six U.S. soldiers and injuring dozens. Chief Warrant Officer 3 Robert Marzan, who had served in the military for 36 years, was among those killed. The Associated Press reported that soldiers and relatives are questioning decisions made before and after the attack.

Several soldiers told the AP that commanders had been warned the port facility, a building with wooden sides in an industrial area south of Kuwait City, lacked protection against drones. Some said senior officers pressed for troops to be given the all-clear to leave nearby bunkers before the strike. It remains unclear who made the final decision.

“We have the right to know what really happened,” Marzan’s widow, Tina Marzan, told the AP. “If somebody messed up, those people need to be held responsible.”

The AP’s account draws on interviews with 13 soldiers, many of them officers who held key roles or were familiar with briefings before the attack. Some spoke publicly for the first time, while others requested anonymity, citing fears of reprisal. The Army declined to comment on the reporting, saying it had not yet briefed the families on the investigation’s outcome.

The Army said it would not discuss specific details or individual accounts before briefing the primary next of kin on the findings. An official familiar with the investigation told the AP it was completed in June, but the report has not been released because sensitive information must be redacted. The Pentagon also declined to comment.

Before the conflict began on Feb. 28, military planners moved troops to Port Shuaiba, a site the Army had used for decades and considered safer. Major Gen. John Hinson and Brig. Gen. Clint Barnes followed that approach ahead of the war, despite concerns about the port’s defenses and the risk of a drone attack, according to officers and an enlisted soldier familiar with intelligence assessments.

U.S. Army Central and Central Command had directed that troops leave the nearby Camp Arifjan, the AP reported. Proposals to move the logistics headquarters to safer locations outside Kuwait were rejected, according to Major Billy Key, an operations planner who served under Barnes. The port was about 65 miles (104 kilometers) from the Iranian border.

“Kuwait was just too close, that’s the bottom line,” Key said, adding that the country was within range of low-flying drones. Some senior officers said a small group of about 75 soldiers needed to remain in Kuwait for communications and logistical reasons. Key and five other officers told the AP the work could have been done from a safer location with access to a secure communications network.

Officers responsible for force protection warned that Port Shuaiba lacked air defenses against drones, according to soldiers who attended or were familiar with briefings. They said military leaders focused more on the threat from missiles. The only U.S. air defense support for the port was a Patriot system near Camp Arifjan, which was not well suited to intercepting Iranian drones, the AP reported.

In the hours before the attack, soldiers said they saw drones over the port. Key said he reported seeing at least five quadcopters the night before the strike, including one hovering about 40 feet (12 meters) above him. Intelligence briefings had described quadcopters as a possible sign of an impending attack, he said.

On the morning of March 1, Capt. Cody Khork, who oversaw safety for the unit and had opposed moving to the port, told Major Stephen Ramsbottom he believed troops should stay in the bunkers amid incoming missiles and drones, according to Ramsbottom. The two were also concerned that radar used to issue all-clears could not detect low-flying drones.

Ramsbottom said higher-ranking officers urged Khork to clear troops to leave the bunkers, as the logistics team needed to carry out its work. Around 10 a.m., about 20 minutes after the last all-clear, the drone struck the operations center, the AP reported.

Operation Epic Fury began on Feb. 28. The article said the conflict had killed 19 U.S. personnel, wounded more than 800 and cost at least $44 billion.

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