Azerbaijan’s red lines: how it shapes ties with Türkiye

Azerbaijan-Türkiye relations are rooted in a shared history and national and spiritual values. But one principle must never be forgotten when assessing the nature of these ties: brotherhood does not mean limiting sovereignty, sidelining national interests or imposing one state’s political will on another.

As in all its international relations, Azerbaijan consistently upholds the principle of equal partnership in its ties with Ankara. Having preserved its independence through historic trials and at great cost, Azerbaijan bases its foreign policy on protecting national interests, not on subordination to any power centre.

The issue is not limited to Azerbaijan’s position. Türkiye’s record with countries it views as junior partners in its “Neo-Ottoman” project is also marked by crises and wars.

Syria: an unresolved crisis

Türkiye’s Syria policy is one of the bloodiest examples of Ankara’s imperialist policies. The 2016 Operation Euphrates Shield, the 2018 Operation Olive Branch and the 2019 Operation Peace Spring expanded Türkiye’s military presence in northern Syria. Ankara justified these moves by citing border security and the elimination of terrorist threats, but the operations undermined Syria’s territorial integrity and made life unbearable for civilians.

Another aspect of Türkiye’s Syria policy was its arming and regular support for radical religious groups fighting the Bashar al-Assad regime, including the Syrian National Army. These steps made the conflict even more intractable. The war grew bloodier, claiming tens of thousands of lives.

The presence of millions of refugees who fled Syria for Türkiye shows that the problem has not remained confined to foreign policy. The refugee issue has been a major part of Türkiye’s domestic political agenda for years. Today, while Syrian refugees have become a loyal electorate for the AKP, they also pose a social challenge for Türkiye.

Iraq: security pretext or violation of sovereignty?

Türkiye’s military operations in northern Iraq have remained a source of dispute between Ankara and Baghdad for years. Türkiye largely links the operations to its fight against the PKK and border security. Iraq, in turn, objects to military activity on its territory without agreement and to violations of its sovereignty.

Türkiye’s maintenance of military bases and observation posts in the region, along with its regular operations, has turned northern Iraq into a battlefield. At the same time, Türkiye holds separate talks with groups in northern Iraq, effectively weakening the central government.

The dangers these developments pose to local residents, damage to residential areas and the displacement of people from their homes are also consequences of this intervention.

Most concerning is that the Turkish parliament regularly extends the period for cross-border military operations in northern Iraq. Most recently, it approved an extension of the operations through 2028. In other words, this issue is far from over...

Lebanon: in the shadow of religious and political rivalry

Lebanon offers another example of a feature of Türkiye’s regional policy: attempts to gain political influence through historical and religious-cultural ties. The country’s complex confessional system, fragile balance among religious communities and competition among foreign powers have made Lebanon one of the Middle East’s most politically sensitive arenas.

In this region, too, Ankara is seeking to expand its influence by drawing on historical ties, religious affinity and relations with certain communities. Türkiye’s activity in Lebanon is not limited to humanitarian and cultural links; it is part of a broader contest for regional influence.

Türkiye also regularly extends its military mandate under the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). But this official mission is only the visible side of the issue. At the same time, Türkiye’s intelligence agency (MIT) and religious-ideological foundations close to the AKP are intervening in Lebanon’s domestic politics through Sunni groups and Turkmen minorities. As a result, Lebanon has now reached the brink of economic and political collapse.

Sudan: the bloody consequences of a struggle for influence in Africa

Türkiye’s Africa policy is another example of the crises created by Ankara’s efforts to strengthen its status as a regional power across a wider area.

It should be recalled that Türkiye began implementing its plans for Sudan under the country’s former dictator, Omar al-Bashir. Türkiye leased Suakin Island, on the Red Sea coast, for 99 years. The project was officially presented as an effort to preserve historical heritage and develop tourism, but its main purpose later emerged. Türkiye announced plans to build a naval base on Suakin Island with $4 billion in financial support from Qatar. The move was met with disapproval from Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

Türkiye’s plans for Sudan did not end there. When civil war broke out in the country, Türkiye intervened again. This time, it secretly began supplying drones and weapons to Sudan’s official army. In addition, radical Islamist mercenaries were brought to the region through SADAT, known as Türkiye’s “Wagner”. The war consequently became even more devastating. Sudan is now experiencing a severe humanitarian disaster, with more than 12 million people displaced and tens of thousands killed.

Azerbaijan is not Qatar

The most sensitive aspect of the issue for Azerbaijan concerns economic resources and strategic projects. The example of Qatar is important here. Defence, investment and political cooperation between Türkiye and Qatar has developed over many years. But that is only the visible side of the issue. In practice, Qatar is engaged in financing Türkiye’s adventurist policies.

It is true that Azerbaijan and Türkiye have extensive cooperation in energy, transport, the defence industry and investment. Azerbaijan has supported the Turkish economy through SOCAR investments and projects carried out in Garabagh and East Zangazur. But if Türkiye views this support as a “guarantee instrument” for financing its adventurist foreign policy, this must be firmly prevented.

Azerbaijan’s path is one of independence and sovereignty

Azerbaijan is a sovereign state with a strong army, independent diplomacy and economic potential. The country cannot serve as a junior partner in Türkiye’s “Neo-Ottoman” project or as a military outpost in the Caucasus. Tensions with major powers arising from Türkiye’s policies in the Middle East and elsewhere must not affect Azerbaijan’s national security or regional stability.

This is because Azerbaijan’s independence and national interests take precedence over all partnership relations. (Bizim Media)